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Abstract: Research indicates that norms matter for ordinary causal attributions. Across a range of 
cases in which two agents jointly bring about an outcome by performing symmetric actions, but 
with one violating a norm while the other does not, causal ratings are higher for the norm-violating 
agent. A number of competing explanations of this effect have been offered in the literature. In a 
pair of recent papers, Kominsky et al. (2015) and Icard et al. (2017) make a strong case for one of 
these accounts—the counterfactual view—making novel predictions about the pattern of effects 
seen when the original type of case is expanded to include a contrast case without norms or when 
the causal structure is changed. They argue that while the counterfactual view is able to explain 
each of the predicted effects, the alternative accounts are only able to explain some of them. In this 
paper, I argue that this undersells the competing accounts. Further, I present new evidence 
suggesting that the expanded pattern of effects is quite different than predicted, and that it in fact 
coheres better with prominent alternative accounts in the literature than the counterfactual view. 
 
 
A growing body of research indicates that norms, especially injunctive norms, matter for ordinary 
causal attributions (e.g., Hilton and Slugoski 1986, Alicke 1992, Knobe and Fraser 2008, Hitchcock 
and Knobe 2009, Sytsma et al. 2012, Reuter et al. 2014, Kominsky et al. 2015, Livengood et al. 
2017, Icard et al. 2017, Kominsky and Phillips 2019, Livengood and Sytsma forthcoming).2 Recent 
interest in the topic was sparked by a series of findings by Knobe and Fraser (2008) and Hitchcock 
and Knobe (2009). These papers presented the results of three experiments with a common structure. 
In each, participants were given a single vignette involving two “agents” performing symmetric 
 
1 I want to heartily thank David Rose and Jonathan Livengood who were involved in the earlier stages of this project. I 
also want to thank Livengood, Jonathan Kominsky, and two anonymous reviewers for extremely helpful feedback on 
earlier drafts of this paper. Finally, I want to thank the audiences at the AAP conference, Experimental Philosophy 
Group Germany Bi-annual Workshop, the Australasian Experimental Philosophy Conference, and the Empirical 
Philosophy Workshop at Victoria University of Wellington. 
2 By “ordinary causal attributions” I specifically mean the use of language like “X caused Y” (see Sytsma et al. 2019 for 
further discussion). Some researchers arguably go further than this, asserting that norms matter not just for ordinary 
causal attributions, but for causal cognition more generally (Danks et al. 2014), but I will focus on just ordinary causal 
attributions. Further, there is ongoing debate about which types of norms impact ordinary causal attributions, and 
specifically whether descriptive norms (often referred to as “statistical norms”) generally have an independent effect or 
whether they play a role in mediating injunctive norms (e.g., Knobe and Fraser 2008; Sytsma et al. 2012; Livengood et 
al. 2017). Injunctive norms include both prescriptive norms (what should be done) and proscriptive norms (what should 
not be done). In the existing literature, authors often use the expression “prescriptive norm” to refer to both prescriptive 
and proscriptive norms. 
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actions that jointly brought about a bad outcome.3 The causal structure in each was conjunctive: if 
either of the agents had not performed the action, the outcome would not have occurred. The 
principle difference in the vignettes was that one agent violated a norm and the other did not. And in 
each case the researchers found that despite the two actions being jointly necessary for the outcome, 
causal ratings were notably higher for the agent violating the norm than for the agent who did not 
violate the norm. I’ll refer to this as the cross-agent effect to highlight that it is comparing two 
different agents in the same scenario. 
 Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) offered an ingenious explanation of the cross-agent effect that 
hinges on the salience of different counterfactuals. This counterfactual view has been further 
developed since then, including in recent papers by Kominsky et al. (2015) and Icard et al. (2017) 
that focus on several further effects of norms on causal attributions.4 They argue that the occurrence 
of these further effects lends support to the counterfactual view and raises problems for alternative 
accounts that have been put forward in the literature, including the bias view (Alicke 1992, 2000; 
Alicke et al. 2011; Rose 2017), the pragmatic view (Samland and Waldmann 2016, Samland et al. 
2016), and our responsibility view (Sytsma et al. 2012, Livengood et al.2017, Sytsma et al. 2019, 
Livengood and Sytsma forthcoming). 
 To elicit these further effects, we begin by adding a second condition in which neither agent 
violates a norm to experiments like those conducted by Knobe and Fraser (2008) and Hitchcock and 
Knobe (2009). The result is that the normative status of one agent is varied between the two 
conditions (the varied agent violates a norm in one condition but not the other), while the normative 
status of the other agent is fixed between the two conditions (the fixed agent doesn’t violate the 
norm in either condition). Each of the views noted above predict that causal ratings will be higher 
 
3 Hitchcock and Knobe’s second experiment involved two wires rather than agents, although I will focus on cases 
involving agents here.  
4 See also Halpern and Hitchock (2015), Phillips et al. (2015), Kominsky and Phillips (2019). 
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for the varied agent when she violates the norm than when she does not. This effect is sometimes 
referred to as abnormal inflation (e.g., Icard et al. 2017), but for clarity I will refer to it as the varied 
agent effect to emphasize that we are looking at the change in ratings for the varied agent across the 
two conditions.  
More interestingly, Kominsky et al. (2015) note that we can also compare the ratings of the 
fixed agent between the two conditions, predicting that we will see the reverse effect—causal 
ratings for the fixed agent being lower when the varied agent violates the norm than when the varied 
agent does not violate the norm. Kominsky et al. term this the causal superseding effect, while Icard 
et al. call it the supersession effect. In keeping with the previous two effects, however, I’ll refer to it 
as the fixed agent effect to highlight that we are looking at the change in ratings for the fixed agent 
across the two conditions. Although Kominsky et al. are the first to highlight this effect, it can be 
found in the prior literature, although as discussed below it is not seen in all cases.  
 Adding a further wrinkle, we can change the causal structure in these scenarios from 
conjunctive to disjunctive: rather than the two actions being jointly necessary for the outcome as in 
a conjunctive case, in a disjunctive case either action alone is sufficient to bring about the outcome. 
In such cases, Kominsky et al. predict that there will be no fixed agent effect and Icard et al. predict 
that the varied agent effect will be reversed. And they present evidence supporting these predictions. 
Although neither paper notes the cross-agent effect, from the other two effects we can infer that 
they should predict a reverse effect in disjunctive cases where the actions are otherwise symmetric.  
This gives an overall pattern of six effects—cross-agent, varied agent, and fixed agent 
effects in conjunctive cases and their reversal (cross-agent, varied) or absence (fixed agent) in 
disjunctive cases. Assuming this pattern of effects is accurate, it arguably provides strong support 
for the counterfactual view, while raising problems for prominent competing accounts. First, it is 
unclear how the alternative accounts can explain the fixed agent effect in conjunctive cases, since 
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the fixed agent does not violate a norm in either condition. Second, it is unclear how these views 
can explain the reverse cross-agent and varied agent effects in disjunctive cases, given that the same 
normative considerations apply here as do in conjunctive cases. 
 In this paper I will offer responses to each of these two problems. In response to the first, I 
offer an alternative explanation of the fixed agent effect that is consistent with the alternative 
accounts found in the literature: I argue that the fixed agent effect might be nothing more than a 
context effect, with the varied agent providing the relevant context. While this context effect 
hypothesis is able to explain the occurrence of the fixed agent effect in conjunctive cases, it is not 
able to simultaneously explain the absence of the effect reported by Kominsky et al. and the 
presence of the reverse varied agent effect report by Icard et al. for disjunctive cases, raising the 
second problem. In response, I begin by arguing that this problem does not obviously apply to the 
alternative accounts. Focusing on the responsibility view, I note that to show the problem applies 
would require testing responsibility attributions for disjunctive cases, which to the best of my 
knowledge has not previously been done. I then present evidence that raises doubts about the 
overall pattern of evidence. Starting with two widely discussed conjunctive cases, I find that the 
fixed agent effect does not occur reliably for injunctive norms; further, in line with the 
responsibility view but against the counterfactual view, I find that neither the varied agent nor fixed 
agent effects occur for one type of descriptive norm, while tending to be reversed for a second. I 
then turn to disjunctive cases, testing two cases used by Kominsky et al. and Icard et al., and failing 
to find the predicted reverse varied agent effect. Finally, I test responsibility attributions for the 
same disjunctive cases and find that the results are consistent with alternative accounts. I conclude 
that the present evidence not only does not clearly favor the counterfactual view but is more 
consistent with competing views. 
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 Here is how I will proceed. In Section 1, I detail the pattern of effects predicted by the 
counterfactual view and consider the argument that the full pattern is problematic for alternative 
accounts. In Section 2, I argue that while alternative accounts are unable to directly explain the 
fixed agent effect, there is a ready alternative explanation—that the fixed agent effect is a context 
effect—that is compatible with these views. I then further investigate the proposed overall pattern of 
effects, starting with conjunctive cases (Section 3), before turning to disjunctive cases (Section 4).  
 
1. Pattern of Effects 
A large body of research has shown that norms matter for ordinary causal attributions, generating 
debate over how best to explain these findings. Much of this discussion initially centered on the 
cross-agent effect. To illustrate, consider the Pen Case given by Knobe and Fraser (2008): 
The receptionist in the philosophy department keeps her desk stocked with pens. The 
administrative assistants are allowed to take the pens, but faculty members are supposed to 
buy their own. 
 
The administrative assistants typically do take the pens. Unfortunately, so do the faculty 
members. The receptionist has repeatedly e-mailed them reminders that only administrative 
assistants are allowed to take the pens. 
 
On Monday morning, one of the administrative assistants encounters Professor Smith 
walking past the receptionist’s desk. Both take pens. Later that day, the receptionist needs to 
take an important message… but she has a problem. There are no pens left on her desk. 
 
Here we see that two agents perform symmetric actions (taking pens), jointly bringing about a bad 
outcome (no pens are left for the receptionist). Further, both actions were necessary for the outcome 
to occur—the outcome would not have occurred if either agent had not taken a pen—making this a 
conjunctive case. The only notable difference between the two actions is that Professor Smith 
violated an injunctive norm in taking a pen, while the administrative assistant did not.  
Knobe and Fraser asked participants two questions about this vignette—whether Professor 
Smith caused the problem and whether the administrative assistant caused the problem. The results 
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showed a notable difference, with ratings for Professor Smith being significantly higher than for the 
administrative assistant. This is the cross-agent effect. Similar conjunctive scenarios were 
subsequently tested by Hitchcock and Knobe (2009)—one involving agents jointly bringing about a 
good outcome, one involving two parts of a machine jointly bringing about a bad outcome—with 
similar results: causal ratings for the norm-violating “agent” are significantly higher than for the 
norm-conforming “agent.”  
Hitchcock and Knobe offer an explanation of the effect of norms on causal attributions that 
emphasizes counterfactuals. They explain the cross-agent effect in terms of the cognitive processes 
that generate ordinary causal attributions taking normality judgments into account. Hitchcock and 
Knobe argue that causal attributions serve to identify suitable intervention points. Information about 
norms then plays a role because norms are relevant to identifying suitable intervention points in 
some situations. The basic idea is that when people assess intervention points, they consider 
counterfactuals on which the outcome does not occur, and norms play a role in which 
counterfactuals they consider—people being more likely to consider a counterfactual in which an 
abnormal event is replaced with a more normal one. This counterfactual view has subsequently been 
developed in a number of papers, including by Kominsky et al. (2015) and Icard et al. (2017), with 
the focus shifting from the cross-agent effect to other effects that can be tested when scenarios like 
the Pen Case are extended to remove the norm violation and when the causal structure is changed 
from conjunctive to disjunctive.  
 
1.1 Non-normative Contrast 
When giving participants the version of the Pen Case discussed above, the only comparison that can 
be made is between the two agents. Subsequent work has expanded on this, adding a comparison 
condition in which neither agent violates a norm. For instance, Sytsma et al. (2012) tested both the 
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original Pen Case and a version in which the injunctive norm was removed, making it so that there 
was no departmental policy with regard to taking pens.5 Looking across these two versions, the 
normative status of one agent’s action is varied (in one scenario Professor Smith violates a norm, in 
the other she does not) while the normative status of the other agent’s action is fixed (the 
administrative assistant does not violate a norm in either scenario). There are now two further 
comparisons that could be made—we could compare ratings for the varied agent across the two 
conditions and we could compare ratings for the fixed agent across the two conditions.  
Comparing ratings for the varied agent in Sytsma et al. (2012), the mean for Professor Smith 
is significantly higher when she violated the norm (m=4.05, sd=2.14, n=59) than when she did not 
(m=3.00, sd=1.80, m=45), t(100.99)=2.72, p=0.0038, d=0.53 (W=1704.5, p=0.0061).6 This is the 
varied agent effect. A similar comparison can be carried out for the fixed agent. Given that the fixed 
agent’s action is described the same way in each scenario—she doesn’t violate a norm in either 
case—we might expect that the causal ratings will be roughly the same. But, in fact, there is a 
comparable difference to that seen for the varied agent, although running in the opposite direction: 
the mean rating for the administrative assistant was significantly lower in the condition where 
Professor Smith violated the norm (m=2.51, sd=1.81, n=59) compared to the condition where 
Professor Smith did not violate a norm (m=3.53, sd=2.01, m=45), t(89.531)=2.69, p=0.0043, d=0.54 
(W=1735.5, p=0.0030). This is the fixed agent effect. 
 
 
 
5 This was part of a larger set of variations tested where the typicality of the agents’ actions was also varied, as 
discussed in Section 3. 
6 Sytsma et al. did not test the comparisons discussed in this section, so I have reanalyzed the data. Since the effects at 
issue are all directional—for instance, the fixed agent effect occurring when ratings for the fixed agent are lower when 
the varied agent violates a norm than when the varied agent does not violate a norm—I’ll use one-tailed tests throughout 
this paper. And while it is typical to test for effects of norms on causal attributions using parametric statistics, the 
distributions are often non-normal, as will be clear below; as such, I will report non-parametric tests (either Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests or Wilcoxon rank sum tests) in addition to the standard t-tests. 
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1.2 Counterfactual Sufficiency and Disjunctive Cases 
While the fixed agent effect can be seen in Sytsma et al. (2012), we did not note this effect in our 
paper. To the best of my knowledge, Kominsky et al. (2015) are the first to highlight the effect and 
to offer an explanation of it—the counterfactual sufficiency account. As the name suggests, 
Kominsky et al.’s explanation follows from the counterfactual view. As with the counterfactual 
view, the counterfactual sufficiency account starts with the claim that norm violations make 
counterfactuals in which the norm was not violated salient and that people are more likely to 
consider salient counterfactuals. They then focus on the sufficiency condition for a causal relation. 
The idea is that when this condition holds, the occurrence of an event is sufficient for the 
occurrence of the outcome (if the event occurs, then the outcome occurs). To this Kominsky et al. 
add the notion of sensitivity (Woodward 2006): the more likely it is that a causal condition would 
cease to hold if the background conditions were slightly different, the more sensitive it is. Putting 
these together, the idea is that in a scenario like the Pen Case, people recognize that Professor Smith 
did something abnormal (he broke the injunctive norm). This makes the counterfactual in which she 
does something more normal instead (doesn’t take a pen) salient, such that people are likely to 
consider this counterfactual. And if Professor Smith didn’t take a pen, then the outcome would not 
have occurred. As such, considering this counterfactual highlights the sensitivity of the sufficiency 
condition for the administrative assistant: if Professor Smith did not take a pen, then the 
administrative assistant taking a pen would not lead to the problem. Finally, following Woodward, 
Kominsky et al. argue that when a sufficiency condition is judged to be highly sensitive, people are 
reluctant to attribute causation. Taking these parts together, the counterfactual sufficiency account is 
able to explain the fixed agent effect.  
What is perhaps most interesting about Kominsky et al.’s account is that it not only makes a 
prediction about when the fixed agent effect should occur, but also when it should not occur. 
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Specifically, Kominsky et al.’s account predicts that the effect should only occur when the 
sufficiency condition is threatened. This means that it should occur in conjunctive cases, where 
either action alone is insufficient to bring about the outcome and that it should not occur in 
disjunctive cases where either action alone is sufficient. Kominsky et al. then provide evidence that 
the fixed agent effect occurs in conjunctive cases and not in disjunctive cases. Intriguingly, this 
includes an experiment where a statistical norm applies to a non-agent7, highlighting a further 
prediction of the counterfactual view: the pattern of effects should be found for both injunctive and 
descriptive norms.  
 Icard et al. (2017) build on the work of Kominsky et al., offering a sophisticated account of 
causal judgements that involves probabilistically sampling counterfactual scenarios. This account 
leads them to a further prediction: the varied agent effect will be reversed in disjunctive scenarios 
(what they term abnormal deflation). Again, this prediction begins with the idea that people are 
more likely to consider counterfactuals on which an abnormal event is replaced with a more normal 
event. The next step in the prediction calls on considerations of necessity: Icard et al. suggest that 
people will be reluctant to judge that an agent caused an outcome when they recognize that the 
agent’s action was not necessary for the outcome—that is, when they recognize that the outcome 
would have occurred even if that agent had not acted. And putting these two ideas together 
generates the prediction: people will be more likely to consider what would have happened if the 
varied agent had not acted when she violated a norm compared to when she did not violate a norm; 
and, when people consider this counterfactual in a disjunctive case, they will recognize that the 
varied agent’s action was not necessary for the outcome, making them less likely to judge that she 
 
7 In Experiment 4, Kominsky et al. looked at a fixed event and a varied event, manipulating the statistical probability of 
the varied event. Unlike in the their other three experiments, however, Kominsky et al. didn’t assess ordinary causal 
attributions, but “because” statements (e.g., “Alex won because of the coin flip”) and it is unclear whether such 
statements work analogously to causal attributions in this type of scenario; see Livengood and Machery (2007) and 
Livengood et al. (2017, fn39) for evidence that “X caused Y” and “Y because X” statements sometimes come apart. 
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caused it. This prediction is then tested across two experiments, with Icard et al. finding the reverse 
varied agent effect in disjunctive cases for both injunctive norms (Experiment 1) and descriptive 
norms (Experiment 2).8 Further, Kominsky and Phillips (2019) found a comparable effect for 
disjunctive cases with injunctive norms (Experiment 2). While neither Kominsky et al. or Icard et al. 
specifically note the cross-agent effect, putting their predictions for disjunctive cases together it 
appears that they should also expect to find a reverse cross-agent effect in scenarios where the 
agents’ actions are symmetric.9  
Summing up, the counterfactual view predicts a complex pattern of effects: for both 
injunctive and descriptive norms advocates expect to find cross-agent, varied agent, and fixed agent 
effects in conjunctive cases and to find that these effects are either reversed (cross-agent, varied 
agent) or absent (fixed agent) in disjunctive cases. And between Kominsky et al. (2015) and Icard et 
al. (2017), they provide direct evidence for all but one of these effects: since Kominsky et al. only 
tested judgments about the fixed agent in disjunctive cases and Icard et al. only tested judgments 
about the varied agent10, neither is able to show the occurrence of a reverse cross-agent effect. 
However, since both papers tested a disjunctive version of the Motion Detector case (discussed in 
more detail in Section 4) we can indirectly check this prediction and it appears to be borne out.11  
 
1.3 Argument for the Counterfactual View 
That the counterfactual view can explain the full pattern of effects just noted is taken to be a point in 
its favor; in contrast, it is argued that competing accounts are only able to explain some of the 
 
8 As in Kominsky et al.’s Experiment 4, the second experiment asked about “because” statements involving events. 
9 On the standard assumption that there will be no cross-agent effect in the non-normed condition in such scenarios, if 
there is no fixed agent effect and a reverse varied agent effect, it follows that in the normed condition causal ratings for 
the varied agent will be lower than for the fixed agent. 
10 The same holds for Experiment 2 in Kominsky and Phillips (2019). 
11 Kominsky et al. report of mean of 4.53 for the fixed agent in Experiment 3, while Icard et al. found a mean of 3.24 for 
the varied agent in Experiment 1. 
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effects, raising serious problems for such views. I’ll focus on two potential problems. The first is 
that it might seem that the alternative accounts are not able to explain the fixed agent effect in 
conjunctive cases. The second is that it might seem that the alternative accounts are not able to 
explain the reverse cross-agent and varied agent effects in disjunctive cases.  
To draw out the reasoning behind these two objections, and the responses that I’ll offer to 
them, we need to consider the basic ideas behind the primary alternative accounts that have been put 
forward. Kominsky et al. (2015, 208) consider two broad types of approach to explaining the impact 
of norms on ordinary causal attributions: 
Previous work has been divided on whether we should treat moral considerations as (a) 
playing a role in the operation of people’s causal cognition itself or (b) introducing some 
external bias or pragmatic factor that is skewing the results of what is in fact a purely non-
moral cognition system. 
 
Similarly, Icard et al. distinguish their counterfactual view from a broad family of accounts that 
hold that “the impact of [injunctive] norms arises because people’s causal judgments are influenced 
by judgments that particular agents are blameworthy” (88), and they treat the bias, pragmatic, and 
responsibility views noted above as all falling under this family of accounts.12   
 To draw out the two objections, consider a simple view falling under this family of accounts: 
people tend to form negative evaluations of agents when they violate injunctive norms and these 
 
12 These three alternatives do not exhaust the potential explanations, although they are the most prominent views in the 
present literature and the ones I will focus on. As an anonymous reviewer helpfully noted, there is a longer history of 
attribution research that is relevant to these debates. Most importantly, Heider (1958) distinguishes between impersonal 
causality and personal causality, with the key distinction being between those behaviors perceived as unintentional, 
which are explained in terms of the situations people were in, and those perceived as intentional, which are explained in 
terms of the actor’s reasons. Such a distinction might be called on to explain the effect of norms on causal ratings, with 
the norm-violating agent action being perceived as intentional while the norm-conforming agent's action is perceived as 
unintentional. It is unclear how straightforwardly this distinction can be applied to scenarios like those presently at issue, 
however. For instance, it seems that in the original version of the Pen Case, both Professor Smith and the administrative 
assistant intentionally take pens, and that neither of them had the intention of bringing about the problem for the 
receptionist. Further, while the work of Heider has often been interpreted as making a simpler distinction between 
person-causes and situation-causes (see Malle 2011, Section 3), there are serious problems with such an account as 
Malle notes (see Section 7.2). With regard to the Pen Case, in line with the above considerations, it seems that focusing 
on the agents’ reasons for taking pens, we could treat either as person-causes, but focusing on the external demands on 
these agents’ we could alternatively treat either as agent-causes. 
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evaluations in turn tend to influence their causal judgments, such that they are more likely to treat a 
norm-violating agent as having caused a bad outcome. This view can readily explain the cross-agent 
and varied agent effects in conjunctive scenarios, since the effects lineup with the norm violations. 
But what about the fixed agent effect? Since the fixed agent doesn’t violate a norm in either 
condition—since the fixed agent doesn’t do anything wrong—it seems that the simple view has no 
direct explanation for this effect. Kominsky et al. do not explicitly consider this worry, but they do 
note that “if morality functioned as an outside bias that skewed our causal judgment, it would be 
somewhat surprising if that bias operated on only some causal structures and not others” (2015, 
208). As seen above, they provide evidence that the fixed agent effect occurs in conjunctive cases 
but that it does not occur in disjunctive cases. Since the simple view would not seem to predict a 
fixed agent effect in either type of case, however, it is only the occurrence of the effect in 
conjunctive cases that is problematic. This is the first problem. 
 Turning to the cross-agent and varied agent effects, the issue is reversed for the simple view: 
while it can explain the occurrence of these effects in conjunctive cases, it does not seem to be able 
to explain the reverse effects in disjunctive cases, since the same pattern of norm violations occur 
but the causal attributions are quite different. The simple view explains the effect of norms on 
causal attributions in terms of norm violations leading to negative evaluations of the agent, but such 
evaluations do not seem to depend on causal structure. This is the second problem. 
 The first problem is a live issue not just for the simple view, but for the alternative accounts 
noted by Icard et al. more generally. It is at best unclear that the same holds for the second problem, 
however. The reason is that unlike the simple view, the responsibility, bias, and pragmatic views 
each allow that causal structure will matter for causal attributions. I will focus on explaining why 
this holds for the responsibility view but will note how similar considerations also apply to the other 
two views. 
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1.4 Alternative Accounts and Causal Structure  
While there are some clear similarities between the responsibility, bias, and pragmatic views, it is 
important to note that unlike the latter two the responsibility view does not hold that “external bias 
or pragmatic factors” are “skewing the results of what is in fact a purely non-moral cognitive 
system.” Instead the responsibility view holds that the evaluation of norms is directly relevant to the 
correct application of the ordinary concept of causation typically at play in causal attributions (at 
least in English) because that concept itself has a normative component. As such, the responsibility 
view is better thought of as belonging to Kominsky et al.’s family (a). The basic idea is that causal 
attributions typically serve to indicate something more than simply that an entity brought about an 
outcome; they also express a normative evaluation of the action similar to saying that the entity is 
responsible for or accountable for the outcome.13 This stands in contrast to the bias view, which 
holds that the ordinary concept of causation is non-normative but that evaluations of the agents bias 
the application of this concept. And it stands in contrast to the pragmatic view, which holds that 
when participants answer questions about causal attributions in studies like those discussed above, 
they interpret the questions not as asking about causation, but about a separate notion such as 
accountability or responsibility. 
 A key point to note here is that unlike the simple view discussed above, the responsibility 
view does not focus on evaluations of just an agent, but on judgments that the agent caused an 
outcome, taking these to be similar to judgments that the entity is responsible for the outcome. 
 
13 While the cases focused on in this paper involve agents, the responsibility view is not specifically focused on agents, 
but allows that similar considerations will apply to (what philosophers take to be) non-agentive objects. This contrasts 
with the way Samland and Waldman think about responsibility and related attributions. They hold that such attributions 
are specific to agents—“that people, not objects, are held accountable for a negative outcome” (2016, 175). Research by 
Bloom (2007), Rose (2015), and Rose and Schaffer (2017), among others, suggests that people tend to take an agentive 
perspective on nature as a whole. This difference between the pragmatic and responsibility views is especially relevant 
to an important criticism raised by Kominsky and Phillips (2019). In their fourth experiment, they find that violations of 
norms of proper functioning in objects (artifacts malfunctioning) affect causal attributions similarly to violations of 
injunctive norms for agents, and argue that this cannot be explained by the pragmatic account, which focuses on moral 
responsibility, assuming that such considerations do not apply to artifacts. These results are consistent with the 
responsibility view, however, which doesn’t assume such a restriction. 
 14 
While negative evaluations of an agent and judgments that the agent is responsible for a bad 
outcome will sometimes coincide, as they plausibly do in conjunctive cases, this need not be the 
case: an agent could arouse negative evaluations without being responsible for a bad outcome, and 
an agent could be responsible for a bad outcome without necessarily arousing negative evaluations 
(see Sytsma and Livengood under review). The former is perhaps most clear if we imagine a case 
where an agent violates an injunctive norm that is unrelated to bringing about the outcome at issue. 
Imagine for instance, that in the Pen Case scenario, there is an honor bar in the philosophy 
department and that Professor Smith takes a candy bar without paying for it. Imagine further that 
there is only one pen on the receptionist’s desk, that the administrative assistant takes that pen, and 
that the problem arises without Professor Smith taking a pen. While the simple view might predict 
that people would judge that Professor Smith caused the problem, the responsibility view does not: 
Smith might be a jerk, but she isn’t responsible for the issue with the pens. The upshot is that it is 
imperative for our view that the norm violating action is connected to the outcome. And plausibly 
the same holds for the bias and pragmatic view.14 
 That the responsibility view focuses on responsibility for an outcome, not a more general 
evaluation of the agent, is important for present purpose because while causal structure might be 
taken to be irrelevant to forming general evaluations of an agent, it is very plausibly relevant to 
evaluating their responsibility for an outcome. The responsibility view expects that causal 
attributions will typically be similar to responsibility attributions. As such, we can use responsibility 
attributions to generate initial predictions for causal attributions. Thus, to get clear on whether 
 
14 This is relatively straightforward for the pragmatic view, which holds that people (miss)interpret the causal attribution 
questions as asking about responsibility, and presumably those attributions would be understood in terms of 
responsibility for an outcome. The picture is a bit more complicated for the bias view. While the bias view holds that 
evaluations of the agent will matter—for instance Alicke et al. (2011, 670) write that “causal attributions reflect a desire 
to praise or denigrate those whose actions we applaud or deride”—the view allows that a variety of factors will go into 
this, and this explicitly includes the outcome (one might expect evaluations of an agent to be worse when that agent is to 
blame for a bad outcome).  
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causal attributions for disjunctive cases are problematic for the responsibility view, we need to test 
responsibility attributions for such cases, as is done in Section 4. Prior to looking at the empirical 
results, however, there is reason to expect that responsibility attributions will be different in 
disjunctive scenarios than in matching conjunctive scenarios. To begin with, this seems intuitively 
plausible. Responsibility for a bad outcome would seem to be most clear when someone does 
something wrong and but for that misdeed the outcome would not have occurred (as holds in 
conjunctive cases). In contrast, responsibility would seem to be at least partially mitigated if the 
outcome would have occurred regardless of the misdeed (as holds in disjunctive cases).15  
There is also empirical reason to expect a connection, here. For instance, Gailey and Falk 
(2008, 674) find that “it appears as though people, when asked to attribute responsibility for 
wrongdoing, examine four aspects: the cause, prior knowledge, intentions of the actor, and whether 
the actor appreciated the moral wrongfulness of the act.” The questions making up the “cause” 
factor here did not ask for causal attributions, however, but included questions related to causal 
structure—whether the agent could have avoided the outcome and whether anything else could have 
prevented the outcome. Further, causal structure will often be relevant to inferring the knowledge 
and intentions of the agents in a causal scenario, and both have been found to impact responsibility 
and related attributions (e.g., Cushman 2008, Gailey and Falk 2008, Lagnado and Channon 2008, 
Young and Saxe 2011, Malle et al. 2014). One way to draw this out is to note that the connection 
between injunctive norm and outcome varies with causal structure: in conjunctive cases, the norm 
 
15 This is congruent with standard thinking about causation in the law, where the “but-for rule”—but for the action, the 
harm would not have occurred—is “by far the dominant explicit test for cause in fact in both torts and criminal law” 
(Moore 2019, Section 2). And the law typically counts conjunctive but not disjunctive, or over-determined, cases as 
exhibiting cause in fact. As Moore notes, cause in fact is one of “two very different requirements for liability” in the law, 
with the second being legal or proximate cause. While the concept of proximate cause is less clear, we suspect it is close 
to the ordinary use of “cause” in causal attributions, and in line with the responsibility view its application is an 
“evaluative issue.” Typically, proximate causation judgments are taken to require establishing both cause in fact and 
some form of culpability. As a result, causal structure will matter for proximate causation judgments, with it being 
easier to uphold such judgments in conjunctive cases than in disjunctive cases. 
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provides a means of preventing the outcome—if the agent had abided by the norm, then the 
outcome would not have occurred. In disjunctive cases, though, the norm does not do so—whether 
or not the agent had abided by the norm, the outcome would have occurred. The more closely a 
norm is connected to the outcome, however, the more plausible the inference that the norm-
violating agent either knew or should have known the risk.  
In fact, there is empirical research demonstrating that casual structure matters for people’s 
responsibility attributions (Gerstenberg and Lagnado 2010, 2012; Lagnado et al. 2013; Zultan et al. 
2012).16 As Lagnado and Gerstenberg (2017, 586) summarize, their criticality-pivotality model of 
responsibility attributions predicts that “people’s responsibility judgments increase, the more critical 
a person’s action was perceived to be for the outcome.” This is illustrated by considering two 
simple voting scenarios involving two agents—one with a conjunctive structure (the motion will 
only pass if both agents vote in favor of it), one with a disjunctive structure (the motion will pass so 
long as at least one votes in favor of it). Lagnado and Gerstenberg then note that each agent’s action 
is less critical in the disjunctive scenario than in the conjunctive scenario, and hence that their 
model predicts that the agents will also be judged to be less responsible for the outcome in the 
disjunctive scenario than in the conjunctive scenario. Pulling these points together, while work 
specifically on responsibility attributions for disjunctive cases involving injunctive norms is needed 
for the responsibility view to make more concrete predictions about such cases, we would at 
minimum predict that causal attributions for the varied agent will tend to be lower when she violates 
the norm in a disjunctive case compared to when she does so in a matching conjunctive case. 
 
16 While Gerstenberg and Lagnado often discuss this in terms of causal responsibility, the key questions they ask just 
concern responsibility. And while philosophers often distinguish between causal and moral responsibility, it is unclear 
whether such a distinction features prominently in ordinary causal attributions. We suspect that the ordinary concept of 
responsibility at play in responsibility attributions is a normative concept, and that the judgments elicited by 
Gerstenberg and Lagnado’s prompts primarily involve this concept. 
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Summing up, the pattern of results reported by Kominsky et al. and Icard et al. raise two 
potential problems for prominent alternatives to the counterfactual view. The first problem is that 
these views do not seem to be able to offer a direct explanation for the occurrence of the fixed agent 
effect in conjunctive cases. While I take this to be a clear worry for alternative accounts, I believe 
there is a ready response: the fixed agent effect can be explained indirectly as a context effect where 
the relevant context is provided by the differences in causal judgments concerning the varied agent. 
This is laid out in the next section. The second problem is that the alternative accounts do not seem 
to be able to explain the reverse cross-agent and varied agent effects in disjunctive cases. As just 
discussed, it is not clear whether this is a live worry for accounts like the responsibility view, since 
we would expect causal structure to be relevant to responsibility judgments. Nonetheless, the 
alternative accounts do not obviously predict the overall pattern of effects, while the counterfactual 
view does, which all else being equal would suggest in favor of the counterfactual view. To explore 
this objection further, I further investigate the purported pattern of effects, starting with conjunctive 
cases in Section 3 and extending this to disjunctive cases in Section 4. 
 
2. Alternative Explanation: Context Effect 
As Icard et al. (2017) suggest, the various competing accounts of the effect of norms on ordinary 
causal attributions can explain the cross-agent and varied agent effects in conjunctive cases. It is 
less clear that the alternative accounts can directly explain the fixed agent effect in conjunctive 
cases, however. Nonetheless, while the alternative accounts are arguably unable to offer a direct 
explanation for the effect, they can offer an indirect explanation. And one explanation readily 
presents itself—that the fixed agent effect is merely an artefact. Specifically, I suggest that the fixed 
agent effect is a context effect that arises from relative differences in the perceived causal strength 
of the agents affecting how participants interpret the scale used in eliciting their causal ratings.    
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 The occurrence of context effects in survey research is well recognized (Sudman, Bradburn, 
and Schwarz 1996, Chapter 4). And this includes ratings of stimuli. Schwarz (1996, 77) summarizes:  
As numerous studies demonstrate, respondents use the most extreme stimuli to anchor the 
endpoints of a rating scale. As a result, a given stimulus will be rated as less extreme if 
presented in the context of a more extreme one, than if presented in the context of a less 
extreme one.  
 
One relevant illustration comes from Schwarz, Münkel, and Hippler (1990). In their experiment, 
participants were asked to rate how “typically German” four drinks were on a 9-point scale 
anchored at 1 with “not at all typical” and at 9 with “very typical.” The first drink in the list was 
varied between a prototypically German drink (beer) and an atypical drink (vodka). The remaining 
three drinks were fixed (wine, coffee, and milk). Schwarz and colleagues found that the mean 
typicality rating for the fixed drinks was significantly lower when preceded by beer (m=4.42) than 
when preceded by vodka (m=5.40). This is essentially a “fixed agent effect” for typicality 
judgments: the extent to which the target drinks (fixed drinks) are judged to be typically German is 
affected by the typicality status of the other drink (varied drink).  
 Consider how such a context effect might arise in the studies we have looked at. Accepting 
that injunctive norm violations increase judgments of causal strength, in these studies participants 
are asked to assess a causal statement about the fixed agent either in the context of a comparison 
agent whose causal strength is relatively moderate (the varied agent does not violate the norm) or 
relatively extreme (the varied agent violates the norm). Based on the known occurrence of context 
effects alone, we would expect the ratings for the fixed agent to be lower when contrasted with a 
varied agent who violates a norm than when contrasted with a varied agent who does not violate a 
norm. But that is exactly what is at issue for the fixed agent effect. As such, it is prima facie 
plausible that the effect is nothing more than a context effect, and such a context effect is consistent 
with the alternative accounts found in the literature. To illustrate that the fixed agent effect might 
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simply be a context effect, I ran two studies as a proof of concept, showing that a comparable 
context effect can arise using questions like those employed in Kominsky et al.’s experiments. 
 
2.1 Study 1: Height Judgments, Two Claims 
2.1.1 Methods 
Participants for each study in this paper were recruited through advertising for a free personality test 
on Google. After answering the questions reported below, participants answered basic demographic 
questions and took a 10-item Big Five personality inventory. Participants for each study were 
restricted to native English-speakers who were 16 years of age or older. In Study 1, participants 
were given one of two sets of two claims. The first claim was either “Danny DeVito is tall” or 
“Shaquille O’Neil is tall.” This is analogous to the varied agent in Kominsky et al.’s experiments. 
The second claim was the same in each condition—“Tom Cruise is tall.” This is analogous to the 
fixed agent. In each condition participants were asked to rate their agreement with the claims using 
a 7-point scale anchored at 1 with “strongly disagree,” at 4 with “neutral,” and at 7 with “strongly 
agree.” Results were collected from 133 participants.17 
 
2.1.2 Results 
Results are shown in Figure 1 and tests for key comparisons are summarized in Table 1. Comparing 
ratings for Tom Cruise, the mean was significantly lower when the other claim was about Shaquille 
O’Neil than when it was about Danny DeVito. This is analogous to the fixed agent effect, with 
variation in the height of one member of the pair affecting height judgments about the other. There 
was also a significant “cross-agent effect,” and a significant “varied agent effect.”  
 
17 64.7% women (three non-binary), average age 35.1 years, ranging from 16 to 86. One-way ANOVAs showed no 
effect for gender on either ratings of the “varied agent,” F(2, 130)=0.33, p=0.72, η2=0.005, or the “fixed agent,” F(2, 
130)=0.045, p=0.96, η2=0.001. 
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2.2 Study 2: Height Judgments, One Claim 
Kominsky et al. report a fixed agent effect not just when they asked about both agents, but also 
when they asked about just the fixed agent. As such, I ran a variation on the previous study asking 
about just the “fixed agent.” 
 
2.2.1 Methods 
Participants were asked to consider one of two sets of celebrities before rating their agreement with 
a claim about one of them (“Tom Cruise is tall” in each case) using the same 7-point scale used in 
the previous study. In the first condition, participants were told to “Consider the following two 
celebrities: former NBA player Shaquille O’Neil and actor Tom Cruise.” In the second condition, 
“former NBA player Shaquille O’Neil” was replaced with “actor Danny DeVito.” Results were 
collected from 101 participants.18 
 
Study Cross-agent Effect Varied Agent Effect Fixed Agent Effect 
1 
t(63)=13.40, p=2.2e-16, d=1.67 t(127.39)=16.60, p<2.2e-16, d=2.85 t(130.53)=3.43, p=0.00041, d=0.59 
V=1905.5, p=2.6e-11  W=4191, p<2.2e-16 W=1529, p=0.00087 
2 
  t(94.507)=4.35, p=1.7e-5, d=0.86 
  W=711, p=4.5e-5 
 
Table 1: Tests of analogs of cross-agent, varied agent, and fixed agent effects for Studies 1 and 2. 
All tests one-tailed, significant results in red. 
 
2.2.2 Results 
Results are shown in Figure 1. As seen in Table 1, comparing across the two conditions, the mean 
ratings for Cruise were significantly lower when participants were asked to consider O’Neil than 
when they were asked to consider DeVito. Again, this is analogous to the fixed agent effect, with 
variation in the height of one member of the pair affecting height judgments about the other. 
 
18 69.3% women (one non-binary), average age 30.4 years, ranging from 16 to 69. A one-way ANOVA showed no 
effect for gender, F(2, 98)=0.28, p=0.76, η2=0.006. 
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Figure 1: Results for Studies 1 and 2 with histograms above the plot of the means for each 
condition and showing 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
2.3 Discussion 
The results for relative agreement ratings about the height of Tom Cruise in Studies 1 and 2 are 
most naturally explained in terms of a context effect, with the context provided by the “varied 
agent” affecting responses with regard to the “fixed agent.” That a context effect can be generated 
using a scale standardly employed in research on causal attributions provides proof of concept for 
the alternative hypothesis that the fixed agent effect is nothing more than a context effect. Given the 
occurrence of the varied agent effect in the conjunctive cases tested by Kominsky et al., we should 
not be surprised to also find a context effect for the fixed agent in those cases. I conclude that absent 
evidence to the contrary we should be warry of concluding that any further explanation of the fixed 
agent effect is needed when it occurs alongside the varied agent effect. 
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3. Assessing the Pattern of Effects: Conjunctive Cases 
One problem for alternative accounts of the effect of the effect of norms on causal attributions 
raised by the work of Kominsky et al. (2015) and Icard et al. (2017) is that these views seem unable 
to directly explain the fixed agent effect in conjunctive cases. In the previous section, I offered a 
response, arguing that these accounts can offer an indirect explanation of the fixed agent effect 
when the varied agent effect occurs. Looking at the larger pattern of effects found by Kominsky et 
al. and Icard et al. across conjunctive and disjunctive cases, however, raises the further question of 
why causal structure matters. One issue is that the fixed agent effect was found in conjunctive cases, 
but not in disjunctive cases. Accepting the context effect hypothesis, this is not a problem for the 
alternative accounts on its own. It becomes problematic, however, when combined with Icard et 
al.’s finding of a reverse varied agent effect in disjunctive cases. Given a reverse varied agent effect, 
the context effect hypothesis would plausibly predict that we should also see a reverse fixed agent 
effect. While the overall pattern of effects is indeed critical for assessing the different accounts of 
the effect of norms on causal attributions in the literature, previous studies in the literature (Sytsma 
et al. 2012, Livengood et al. 2017) provide reason to doubt that the pattern is as clear as the studies 
reported by Kominsky et al. and Icard et al. suggest. In this section, I review and replicate these 
findings on conjunctive cases, raising doubts about the reliability of the fixed agent effect and 
whether the fixed agent and varied agent effects occur for all types of norms. 
 
3.1 Pen Case 
The counterfactual view holds that the effects of norms on ordinary causal attributions should be 
seen for all types of norms, including both injunctive and descriptive norms. And Kominsky et al. 
explicitly extend this to the fixed agent effect. Sytsma et al. (2012) investigated the role of 
descriptive norms in causal attributions for the Pen Case, distinguishing between two types—
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population-level statistical norms (whether the agent acts typically relative to the past actions of a 
relevant population) and agent-level statistical norms (whether the agent acts typically relative to 
her past actions). We then derived two predictions from the responsibility view: “First, ordinary 
causal attributions for the Pen Case are insensitive to population-level statistical norms; second, 
ordinary causal attributions for the Pen Case are sensitive to agent-level typicality, not atypicality” 
(816).19 And we presented the results of a series of studies bearing out these predictions.  
As noted above, these studies included testing the original version of the Pen Case as well as 
a version in which the injunctive norm was removed. And, although we did not note it, the results 
revealed not only a cross-agent effect, but a varied agent effect and a fixed agent effect. In addition 
to testing these two conditions, however, we also tested conditions in which one or the other of the 
two types of descriptive norms were also varied. The subsequent results paint a far less rosy picture 
concerning the occurrence of the varied agent and fixed agent effects for all types of norms.  
Looking at the eight conditions from Sytsma et al. in which the fixed agent did not violate a 
norm, there were ten comparisons in total where Kominsky et al. would expect to see varied agent 
effects and ten corresponding comparisons where they would expect to see fixed agent effects. Tests 
for these comparisons are summarized in Table 2. While the varied agent effect occurred reliably 
when just the injunctive norm was varied (significant effects in all four comparisons), it was not 
found in two comparisons where just the population-level statistical norm was varied and significant 
reverse effects were found in two comparisons where just the agent-level statistical norm was 
varied. Turning to the fixed agent effect, it did not occur reliably when just the injunctive norm was 
 
19 The first prediction is based on the expectation that excuses of the form “everybody was doing it” are not generally 
taken to mitigate responsibility. The second prediction is based on the expectation that, in contrast, a person’s pattern of 
behaviors will often be relevant to responsibility judgments. Specifically, in cases where an agent could reasonably be 
expected to know that a bad outcome might result from her behavior, we expect people to be more likely to judge that 
she is responsible for such an outcome when it occurs if her behavior was not a one-off, but part of a pattern of reckless 
behavior, since this pattern increases the chance that such a bad outcome would eventually occur. See Sytsma et al. 
(2012) for extended discussion. 
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varied (significant result in one of four comparisons, with a borderline significant reverse effect in 
another comparison). Further no effect was found in the two comparisons where just the population-
level statistical norm was varied, while a significant reverse effect was found in one of two 
comparisons where just the agent-level statistical norm was varied. Kominsky et al. (2015) gave 
sizes for the fixed agent effect for three relevant t-tests, showing Cohen’s d values of 0.568, 0.691, 
and 0.898, for an average value of 0.719 (I’ll refer to this as an average fixed agent effect). Using 
this value, the tests had a power ranging from 0.950 to 0.989 to detect an average fixed agent effect. 
 
Norms for VA, 
Condition 1 
Norms for VA, 
Condition 2 
Varied Agent Effect Fixed Agent Effect 
Pop-typical, 
Permissible 
Pop-typical, 
Impermissible 
t(100.99)=2.72, p=0.0038, d=0.53 t(89.53)=1.02, p=0.0043, d=0.54 
W=1704.5, p=0.0061 W=1735.5, p=0.0030 
Pop-atypical, 
Permissible 
Pop-atypical, 
Impermissible 
t(83.927)=3.29, p=0.00074, d=0.71 t(83.727)=0.19, p=0.43, d=0.04 
W=1302.5, p=0.00043 W=913, p=0.54 
Pop-typical, 
Permissible 
Pop-atypical, 
Permissible 
R: t(87.913)=0.52, p=0.30, d=0.11 t(87.727)=1.28, p=0.10, d=0.27 
R: W=931.5, p=0.25 W=1180.5, p=0.084 
Pop-typical, 
Permissible 
Pop-atypical, 
Impermissible 
t(83.689)=2.81, p=0.0030, d=0.61 t(83.419)=1.52, p=0.066, d=0.33 
W=1249, p=0.0021 W=1075, p=0.091 
Pop-typical, 
Impermissible 
Pop-atypical, 
Impermissible 
t(95.506)=0.057, p=0.48, d=0.011 R: t(90.938)=1.19, p=0.12, d=0.24 
W=1216.5, p=0.48 R: W=1000.5, p=0.066 
Agent-typical, 
Permissible 
Agent-typical, 
Impermissible 
t(68.991)=4.78, p=4.8e-6, d=1.00 R: t(83.949)=0.94, p=0.17, d=0.19 
W=2126.5, p=7.8e-6 R: W=1322.5, p=0.24 
Agent-atypical, 
Permissible 
Agent-atypical, 
Impermissible 
t(94.655)=1.83, p=0.035, d=0.37 R: t(86.412)=1.60, p=0.057, d=0.33 
W=1401.5, p=0.033 R: W=969, p=0.072 
Agent-typical, 
Permissible 
Agent-atypical, 
Permissible 
R: t(80.953)=3.54, p=0.00033, d=0.77 R: t(79.429)=0.76, p=0.22, d=0.16 
R: W=525.5, p=0.00026 R: W=802, p=0.19 
Agent-typical, 
Permissible 
Agent-atypical, 
Impermissible 
R: t(87.724)=1.77, p=0.040, d=0.37 R: t(91.076)=2.70, p=0.0041, d=0.55 
R: W=849.5, p=0.031 R: W=738.5, p=0.0035 
Agent-typical, 
Impermissible 
Agent-atypical, 
Impermissible 
R: t(93.539)=7.28, p=0.5.0e-11, d=1.38 R: t(101.85)=2.09, p=0.0.019, d=0.39 
R: W=690.5, p=7.3e-10 R: W=1415.5, p=0.011 
 
Table 2: Tests of the varied agent and fixed agent effects for relevant comparisons for Pen Case 
results from Sytsma et al. (2012) where the fixed agent does not violate a norm. All tests one-tailed, 
reverse effects indicated by “R,” significant results in red. 
 
 
Our goal in Sytsma et al. (2012) was not to test the varied agent and fixed agent effects, 
however, and our studies were not designed with this in mind. One potential issue for this purpose is 
that in the conditions in which Professor Smith did not violate an injunctive norm, we did not state 
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that either agent was specifically allowed to take pens, instead stating that they were able to do so 
and making no mention of a departmental policy concerning the taking of pens. In contrast, in the 
vignettes used by Kominsky et al., arguably the normative status of the varied agent’s action is 
clearer. As such, in Study 3 I replicated the eight versions of the Pen Case just considered, changing 
“able” to “allowed” in the relevant conditions. 
 
3.1.1 Methods 
Participants for Study 3 were given one of eight Pen Case vignettes following Sytsma et al. (2012). 
Full text of all vignettes is in the supplemental materials. The first four vignettes varied whether 
Professor Smith violated an injunctive norm and whether she violated a population-level statistical 
norm; the last four varied whether Professor Smith violated an injunctive norm and whether she 
violated an individual-level statistical norm. In each vignette, administrative assistants were allowed 
to take pens, and in the first four vignettes administrative assistants were said to typically take pens, 
while in the last four vignettes the administrative assistant (John) was said to typically take pens. In 
each condition, participants were asked to rate how much they agreed or disagreed with two causal 
statements—“Professor Smith caused the problem” and either “the Administrative Assistant caused 
the problem” (first four conditions) or “John caused the problem” (last four conditions)—on the 
same 7-point scale used in the previous studies. Results were collected from 327 participants.20 
 
3.1.2 Results 
Results are shown in Figure 2. Looking at the ten pairs of comparisons noted above, the results were 
similar to those found by Sytsma et al. and are summarized in Table 3. While the varied agent effect 
 
20 73.7% women (three non-binary), average age 38.3 years, ranging from 16 to 77. One-way ANOVAs showed no 
effect for gender on either ratings of the varied agent, F(2, 324)=0.019, p=0.98, η2=0, or the fixed agent, F(2, 324)=0.11, 
p=0.90, η2=0.001. 
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again occurred reliably when just the injunctive norm was varied (with significant effects in three of 
four comparisons and a borderline significant effect in the fourth), it was not found in two 
comparisons where just the population-level statistical norm was varied and reverse effects were 
found in the two comparisons where just the agent-level statistical norm was varied. Turning to the 
fixed agent effect, again it did not occur reliably when just the injunctive norm was varied (no 
significant effects in the four comparisons, although one comparison was borderline significant). 
Further no effect was found in the two comparisons where just the population-level statistical norm 
was varied, while a significant reverse effect was found in one of two comparisons where just the 
agent-level statistical norm was varied (and a borderline significant reverse effect in the other). The 
tests had a power ranging from 0.939 to 0.945 to detect an average fixed agent effect. 
 
Norms for VA, 
Condition 1 
Norms for VA, 
Condition 2 
Varied Agent Effect Fixed Agent Effect 
Pop-typical, 
Permissible 
Pop-typical, 
Impermissible 
t(74.957)=3.59, p=0.00030, d=0.80 t(77.958)=0.53, p=0.30, d=0.12 
W=1138.5, p=0.00044 W=861, p=0.28 
Pop-atypical, 
Permissible 
Pop-atypical, 
Impermissible 
t(69.313)=4.65, p=7.8e-6, d=1.04 t(77.094)=1.18, p=0.12, d=0.26 
W=1254.5, p=4.5e-5 W=1000, p=0.066 
Pop-typical, 
Permissible 
Pop-atypical, 
Permissible 
R: t(79.06)=0.37, p=0.36, d=0.08 R: t(79.78)=0.46, p=0.32, d=0.10 
R: W=812.5, p=0.40 R: W=785, p=0.30 
Pop-typical, 
Permissible 
Pop-atypical, 
Impermissible 
t(71.851)=4.22, p=3.5e-5, d=0.94 t(76.453)=0.75, p=0.23, d=0.17 
W=1179.5, p=9.7e-5 W=913.5, p=0.13 
Pop-typical, 
Impermissible 
Pop-atypical, 
Impermissible 
t(77.277)=0.78, p=0.22, d=0.17 t(76)=0.27, p=0.61, d=0.06 
W=887, p=0.20 W=862.5, p=0.73 
Agent-typical, 
Permissible 
Agent-typical, 
Impermissible 
t(80.611)=1.42, p=0.079, d=0.31 t(79.846)=1.56, p=0.061., d=0.34 
W=1009.5, p=0.085 W=1025, p=0.064 
Agent-atypical, 
Permissible 
Agent-atypical, 
Impermissible 
t(75.75)=2.18, p=0.016, d=0.48 t(78.801)=0.48, p=0.32, d=0.11 
W=1046.5, p=0.025 W=877, p=0.36 
Agent-typical, 
Permissible 
Agent-atypical, 
Permissible 
R: t(76.503)=2.66, p=0.0047, d=0.59 R: t(80.668)=1.57, p=0.060, d=0.35 
R: W=605, p=0.0084 R: W=695.5, p=0.063 
Agent-typical, 
Permissible 
Agent-atypical, 
Impermissible 
R: t(78.997)=0.46, p=0.32, d=0.10 R: t(78.722)=1.03, p=0.15, d=0.23 
R: W=771, p=0.32 R: W=709.5, p=0.15 
Agent-typical, 
Impermissible 
Agent-atypical, 
Impermissible 
R: t(79.685)=1.91, p=0.030, d=0.42 R: t(77.52)=2.6, p=0.0056, d=0.58 
R: W=639.5, p=0.030 R: W=576, p=0.0065 
 
Table 3: Tests of the varied agent and fixed agent effects for Study 3. All tests one-tailed, reverse 
effects indicated by “R,” significant results in red. 
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Figure 2: Results of Study 3 with histograms above the plot of the means for each condition and 
showing 95% confidence intervals. 
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3.2 Computer Case 
Sytsma et al. (2012) opened with a description of another type of conjunctive case—the Computer 
Case—based on a thought experiment given by Knobe (2006).21 In this case, Lauren and Jane are 
employees of a company that uses a mainframe computer that can be accessed from terminals on 
different floors of its building. The mainframe has become unstable, however, such that it will crash if 
more than one person logs in at the same time. Lauren and Jane both log in at the same time and the 
system crashes. As described in our (2012), citing a then unpublished manuscript, when Jane but not 
Lauren violates an injunctive norm by logging in, participants were significantly more likely to affirm 
that Jane caused the system to crash than Lauren, illustrating the cross-agent effect. 
 In the full set of results reported in Livengood et al. (2017), we also tested variations in 
which there was no injunctive norm in place, allowing for further tests of the varied agent and fixed 
agent effects. We tested seven relevant pairs of cases—the initial scenario with each participant 
asked about both Lauren and Jane (Studies 1 and 9) or about just one of the two agents (Study 2 and 
combining Studies 10 and 14); a variation in which participants were also asked about the 
mainframe (Studies 3 and 13); variations in which participants were asked whether the agents’ 
actions caused the outcome, with each participant either being asked about both actions (Studies 7 
and 11) or just one of the two actions (Studies 8 and 12); and variations in which the issue with the 
mainframe is described as a feature rather than a bug, again with each participant either being asked 
about both agents (Studies 5 and 15) or just one of the two agents (Studies 6 and 16). This gives 
seven comparisons where we would expect to find a varied agent effect and seven comparisons 
where the counterfactual view predicts we should find a fixed agent effect. We did not test these 
comparisons in the original article, but I have reanalyzed the data. The results are summarized in 
 
21 This was also the basis for the cases used by Reuter et al. 2014, as well as the Email Case used in Kominsky et al.’s 
second experiment and Icard et al.’s first experiment. 
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Table 4. A significant varied agent effect was found in each of the seven comparisons, while a 
significant fixed agent effect was found in four of the seven (with a fifth being borderline 
significant). The three tests that did not show a significant effect had powers ranging from 0.948 to 
0.996 to detect an average fixed agent effect.   
Again, our goal in testing the Computer Case was not to test the varied agent and fixed agent 
effects, and our studies were not designed with that in mind. The same potential issue noted for the 
Pen Case applies to these studies: in the cases where an injunctive norm was not violated, we did 
not specify that either agent was specifically allowed to log into the mainframe. As such, in Study 4 
I replicated two of the seven comparisons from Livengood et al.—the initial scenarios and the 
scenarios where the instability was described as a feature rather than a bug, asking each participant 
about both agents—adding a line to the non-normed vignettes making clear that employees were 
allowed to log into any of the terminals. 
 
3.2.1 Methods 
Participants for Study 4 were given one of four vignettes featuring a varied agent (Jane) and a fixed 
agent (Lauren) logging into a mainframe, as described above. In the first two, the mainframe was 
described as being unstable, such that it will crash if more than one person is logged in. In the last 
two, the mainframe was instead described as being designed for a single user. In the first vignette of 
each pair, both agents were allowed to log in, while in the second vignette Jane violated an 
injunctive norm by logging in. In each condition, participants were asked to rate agreement with 
each of two causal statements—“Lauren caused the system to crash” and “Jane caused the system to 
crash”—on the same 7-point scale used previously. Results were collected from 262 participants.22 
 
22 59.2% women (six non-binary), average age 26.5 years, ranging from 16 to 99. One-way ANOVAs showed no effect 
for gender on ratings of the fixed agent, F(2, 259)=0.28, p=0.76, η2=0.002, but did show an effect for the varied agent, 
 30 
3.2.2 Results 
Results are shown in Figure 3 and tests are summarized in Table 4. Replicating the results from 
Livengood et al. (2017), in the first pair of conditions (mainframe unstable) there was a significant 
varied agent effect but not a fixed agent effect, despite the test having a power of 0.989 to detect an 
average fixed agent effect; and, in the second pair of conditions (single user) there was both a 
significant varied agent effect and a significant fixed agent effect. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Results of Study 4 with histograms above the plot of the means for each condition and 
showing 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
 
F(2, 259)=4.97, p=0.0077, η2=0.037. Looking closer, there were notable differences with regard to the fixed agent effect. 
For the first pair of conditions (mainframe unstable), there was a non-significant reverse effect for women, 
t(74.345)=0.52, p=0.30, d=0.12 (W=659.5, p=0.19), and a significant effect for men, t(38.519)=2.07, p=0.023, d=0.64 
(W=310.5, p=0.016). For the second pair of conditions (single user), for women the t-test was borderline significant, 
t(74.36)=1.47, p=0.073, d=0.33, and the Wilcoxon rank sum test was significant, W=939.5, p=0.018, while both tests 
were significant for men, t(37.561)=3.91, p=0.00019, d=1.09 (W=618, p=0.00024). 
 31 
 
Condition 1 
(no violation) 
Condition 2 
(norm violation) 
Varied Agent Effect Fixed Agent Effect 
Livengood et al. 
Study 9 
Livengood et al. 
Study 1 
t(140.98)=6.91, p=7.8e-11, d=1.16 t(140.46)=0.82, p=0.21, d=0.14 
W=3961.5, p=2.1e-9 W=2701, p=0.26 
Livengood et al. 
Study 10+14 
Livengood et al. 
Study 2 
t(49.509)=6.30, p=3.9e-8, d=1.44 R: t(56.815)=0.77, p=0.22, d=0.16 
W=2426, p=1.2e-8 R: W=1215, p=0.19 
Livengood et al. 
Study 13 
Livengood et al. 
Study 3 
t(98.766)=6.29, p=4.3e-9, d=1.19 t(103.52)=4.22, p=2.6e-5, d=0.76 
W=2656.5, p=9.3e-9 W=2238.5, p=0.00018 
Livengood et al. 
Study 11 
Livengood et al. 
Study 7 
t(85.157)=4.83, p=2.9e-6, d=1.02 t(84.83)=1.75, p=0.042, d=0.37 
W=1545, p=9.9e-6 W=1242.5, p=0.037 
Livengood et al. 
Study 12 
Livengood et al. 
Study 8 
t(67.721)=4.20, p=4.0e-5, d=0.98 t(81.583)=1.42, p=0.080, d=0.31 
W=1046.5, p=7.5e-5 W=1041, p=0.066 
Livengood et al. 
Study 15 
Livengood et al. 
Study 5 
t(111.78)=5.55, p=9.9e-8, d=1.02 t(115.8)=2.95, p=0.0019, d=0.53 
W=2602.5, p=3.7e-7 W=2171.5, p=0.0039 
Livengood et al. 
Study 16 
Livengood et al. 
Study 6 
t(63.956)=4.82, p=4.56e-6, d=1.16 t(64.7)=3.11, p=0.0014, d=0.70 
W=904, p=1.6e-5 W=955.5, p=0.0032 
Replication, 
Unstable 
Replication, 
Unstable 
t(118.67)=5.50, p=1.1e-7, d=1.00 t(115.79)=0.81, p=0.21, d=0.15 
W=2792.5, p=4.3e-7 W=1969, p=0.27 
Replication, 
Single User 
Replication, 
Single User 
t(134.2)=7.69, p=1.4e-12, d=1.30 t(122.67)=3.54, p=0.00028, d=0.61 
W=3929.5, p=2.6e-11 W=3252.5, p=6.1e-5 
 
Table 4: Tests of the varied agent and fixed agent effects for relevant comparisons for the 
Computer Case results from Livengood et al. (2017) and Study 4. All tests one-tailed, reverse 
effects indicated by “R,” significant results in red. 
 
3.3 Discussion 
Whether looking at Sytsma et al.’s (2012) original results for the Pen Case or the replication, there 
is consistent evidence of the varied agent effect for the injunctive norm, while the results are mixed 
for the fixed agent effect. In line with the responsibility view and against the counterfactual view, 
neither effect is found for population-level statistical norms while the effects tend to be reversed for 
agent-level statistical norms. And despite finding the expected cross-agent and varied agent effects 
across seven pairs of probes for the Computer Case in Livengood et al. (2017), a significant fixed 
agent effect was only found in four of the pairs. Two pairs of conditions were replicated in Study 4, 
and showed comparable results—there was a significant varied agent effect in each pair, but a 
significant fixed agent effect was only found in one of the two pairs.  
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Overall, a significant fixed agent effect was only found in six out of 17 comparisons where 
an injunctive norm was varied. Both the counterfactual view and context effect hypothesis are able 
to explain the effects when they occurred, given that a significant varied agent effect was also found 
in each of these cases. But neither readily explains why the fixed agent effect was only found in a 
minority of the comparisons. Further work is needed here. Nonetheless, insofar as the 
counterfactual view directly predicts the occurrence of a fixed agent effect, while the alternative 
views only do so only indirectly, rather than supporting the counterfactual view over the alternatives, 
if anything the current results suggest the reverse.  
 
4. Assessing the Pattern of Effects: Disjunctive Cases 
We have seen that the overall pattern of effects across both conjunctive and disjunctive cases is 
important for assessing the explanations of the impact of norms on causal attributions that have 
been put forward. In the previous section, however, we saw that part of the supposed pattern doesn’t 
occur as systematically as predicted by the counterfactual view. In this section, I extend the 
investigation to disjunctive cases. I begin by replicating both the conjunctive and disjunctive 
versions of Kominsky et al.’s Motion Detector Case but asking participants about both the varied 
agent and the fixed agent; I then extend this to test responsibility attributions and blame attributions. 
Finally, I test a disjunctive version of Kominsky et al.’s Email Case. 
 
4.1 Motion Detector Case 
In Kominsky et al.’s third experiment they tested the fixed agent effect for both conjunctive and 
disjunctive versions of the same case. In these scenarios, a varied agent (Billy) and a fixed agent 
(Suzy) work on a project that is important for national security. In the non-normed conditions, both 
are supposed to arrive at work at 9am; in the normed conditions, Billy is prohibited from arriving in 
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the morning. In each case, both arrive at 9am. It turns out that there is a motion detector installed in 
the room they arrive at, which will either go off if more than one person arrives (conjunctive) or if 
at least one person arrives (disjunctive). Kominsky et al. gave participants one of the resulting four 
vignettes and asked them to assess the statement “Suzy caused the motion detector to go off.” As 
they predicted, there was a significant fixed agent effect in the conjunctive conditions, but no effect 
in the disjunctive conditions. The same scenarios were also used in Icard et al.’s first experiment, 
but this time soliciting causal judgments about just the varied agent. As they predicted, there was a 
significant varied agent effect in the conjunctive conditions, and a significant reverse varied agent 
effect in the disjunctive conditions.  
 This pair of results poses an interesting challenge for alternative accounts of the effect of 
norms on causal attributions. First, while the context effect hypothesis can explain the occurrence of 
a fixed agent effect when there is a varied agent effect, it does not explain why we would see a 
reverse varied agent effect without a corresponding reverse fixed agent effect. That said, as seen in 
the previous section, the fixed agent effect is not reliably found in conjunctive cases, including in 
cases where both the counterfactual view and the context effect hypothesis would expect it to occur. 
As such, the absence of the fixed agent effect in a single disjunctive case does not strongly support 
the counterfactual view over competitors. Second, it has been suggested that the alternative 
accounts should make the same predictions about conjunctive and disjunctive versions of the same 
cases, with the result that the occurrence of the varied agent effect in the conjunctive conditions and 
the reverse varied agent effect in the disjunctive conditions looks quite problematic. As noted in 
Section 1, however, the alternative accounts allow that causal structure will matter for causal 
attributions, and based on previous work at minimum views focusing on responsibility for an 
outcome predict that attributions for the varied agent will tend to be lower when she violates the 
norm in a disjunctive case compared to when she does so in a matching conjunctive case. And such 
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an effect appears to be present across Kominsky et al. and Icard et al.’s studies, with the mean 
response for Billy in the normed conjunctive condition (6.00) being notably higher than in the 
normed disjunctive condition (3.24).23  
 To address the challenge posed by results for the Motion Detector Case, in my fifth study I 
replicated then extended these studies. I had three goals. First, given the variability seen for the 
fixed agent effect in conjunctive cases, I wanted to further test that there is reliably no effect in 
disjunctive cases. Second, to investigate whether the results are consistent with the context effect 
hypothesis, I wanted to solicit ratings for both the varied agent and the fixed agent. Finally, to 
assess alternative accounts for disjunctive cases, I wanted to solicit further relevant attributions. 
 
4.1.1 Methods 
Participants in Study 5 were given one of the four vignettes from Kominsky et al.’s third experiment, 
varying the causal structure (conjunctive, disjunctive) and whether the varied agent violated an 
injunctive norm. Participants were asked to rate one of three pairs of causal statements with the 
order of the two questions randomized—either a pair of causal attributions (“Billy caused the 
motion detector to go off,” “Suzy caused the motion detector to go off”), a pair of responsibility 
attributions (“Billy is responsible for the motion detector going off,” “Suzy is responsible for the 
motion detector going off”), or a pair of blame attributions (“Billy is to blame for the motion 
detector going off,” “Suzy is to blame for the motion detector going off”). Participants assessed 
each statement using the same 7-point scale used in the previous studies. Each participant was then 
given the comprehension check used by Kominsky et al., being asked “Who was supposed to show 
 
23 Thanks to Jonathan Kominsky for supplying the means for these cases. 
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up at 9am?” Results were collected from 507 participants, excluding 23 participants who failed the 
comprehension check.24 
 
4.1.2 Results 
Results are shown in Figure 4. An ANOVA looking at ratings for the varied agent with norm 
(neutral, normed), structure (conjunctive, disjunctive), and term (cause, responsibility, blame) as 
between-participant factors showed main effects for norm, F(1, 495)=66.34, p=3.1e-15, η2=0.11, and 
structure, F(1, 495)=5.69, p=0.017, η2=0.010, but not for term, F(2, 495)=1.08, p=0.34, η2=0.004. 
In addition, there was an interaction effect for norm and structure, F(1, 495)=17.74, p=3.0e-5, 
η2=0.030. A matching ANOVA looking at ratings for the fixed agent showed the same pattern of 
effects: main effects for norm, F(1, 495)=18.63, p=1.9e-5, η2=0.034, and structure, F(1, 495)=19.16, 
p=1.5e-5, η2=0.035, but not for term, F(2, 495)=2.08, p=0.13, η2=0.008, and an interaction effect for 
norm and structure, F(1, 495)=4.24, p=0.040, η2=0.008.   
 While the effects seen for norm and structure are potentially consistent with the pattern 
predicted by the counterfactual view, Figure 4 paints a different picture. Planned comparisons 
testing each of the three predicted effects for causal attributions in conjunctive and disjunctive cases 
reveal that while the predictions are born out for the conjunctive conditions (there are significant 
cross-agent, varied agent, and fixed agent effects), the results run counter to two of the three 
predictions for the disjunctive conditions: rather than finding a reverse cross-agent effect, there is a 
borderline significant cross-agent effect, and rather than finding a reverse varied agent effect, the 
mean is higher when the varied agent violates the norm, although the difference is not significant; 
as predicted, however, no effect was found for the fixed agent (despite having a power of 0.941 to 
 
24 71.6% women (two non-binary), average age 27.9 years, ranging from 16 to 99. One-way ANOVAs showed no effect 
for gender on either ratings of the varied agent, F(2, 504)=2.29, p=0.10, η2=0.009, or the fixed agent, F(2, 504)=0.12, 
p=0.88, η2=0. 
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find an average fixed agent effect). Results were similar for responsibility attributions (although 
here the varied agent effect was significant for the disjunctive conditions) and blame attributions 
(with borderline significant varied agent and fixed agent effects in the disjunctive conditions), as 
summarized in Table 5.    
Finally, against the contention that alternative accounts are unable to explain the differences 
in results for conjunctive and disjunctive cases, there were no effects for term: whether participants 
assessed causal attributions, responsibility attributions, or blame attributions did not show a 
significant effect. And while the causal structure did affect ratings, it did so similarly for each type 
of attribution. As such, these results are consistent with each of the alternative accounts discussed in 
Section 1. Further, in line with the prediction derived from previous work on responsibility 
attributions, in the normed conditions causal ratings were significantly higher for the varied agent in 
the conjunctive scenario than in the disjunctive scenario, t(74.693)=2.38, p=0.0099, d=0.53 
(W=1010, p=0.016), and similarly for responsibility ratings, t(78.927)=2.37, p=0.010, d=0.51 
(W=1269, p=0.013), and blame ratings, t(81.822)=2.70, p=0.0042, d=0.58 (W=1214, p=0.0082).  
 
Term Structure Cross-agent Effect Varied Agent Effect Fixed Agent Effect 
Cause 
Conjunctive 
t(39)=7.47, p=2.5e-9, d=1.18 t(77.931)=5.15, p=9.4e-7, d=1.15 t(74.904)=3.28, p=7.9e-4, d=0.73 
V=416, p=3.5e-6 W=1262, p=2.1e-6 W=1115.5, p=0.00055 
Disjunctive 
t(39)=1.39, p=0.086, d=0.22 t(72.514)=0.94, p=0.18, d=0.21 t(72.687)=0.84, p=0.20, d=0.19 
V=160.5, p=0.056 W=940, p=0.12 W=912.5, p=0.18 
Resp. 
Conjunctive 
t(47)=6.32, p=4.4e-8, d=0.91 t(91.611)=5.7, p=7.2e-8, d=1.18 t(91.985)=2.30, p=0.012, d=0.47 
V=704.5, p=3.43e-6 W=1748, p=2.2e-7 W=1413, p=0.0065 
Disjunctive 
t(41)=1.74, p=0.045, d=0.27 t(74.322)=2.11, p=0.019, d=0.46 t(74.339)=0.30, p=0.38, d=0.06 
V=198, p=0.029 W=1064.5, p=0.027 W=917.5, p=0.30 
Blame 
Conjunctive 
t(42)=7.83, p=4.9e-10, d=1.19 t(80.83)=5.15, p=8.9e-7, d=1.13 t(74.427)=2.90, p=0.0025, d=0.64 
V=612, p=3.0e-7 W=1354, p=1.6e-6 W=1142.5, p=0.0026 
Disjunctive 
t(43)=2.25, p=0.015, d=0.34 t(80.095)=1.51, p=0.067, d=0.32 t(83.488)=1.31, p=0.096, d=0.28 
V=276, p=0.017 W=1073.5, p=0.091 W=1089, p=0.065 
 
Table 5: Tests of the cross-agent, varied agent, and fixed agent effects for Study 5. All tests one-
tailed, reverse effects indicated by “R,” significant results in red. 
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Figure 4: Results for Study 5 with histograms above the plots of the means for each condition and 
showing 95% confidence intervals.  
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4.2 Motion Detector Case, Replication 
Against the contention that the alternative accounts cannot explain the pattern of effects found 
across conjunctive and disjunctive cases, the results of Study 5 showed no effect for type of 
attribution. And against the predictions of the counterfactual view, the reverse effects for disjunctive 
cases were not seen. Given that the causal ratings for the varied agent in the disjunctive conditions 
run counter to those found by Icard et al. (2017) and Kominsky and Phillips (2019), some care is 
needed here, however. As such, in Study 6 I directly replicated the cause and responsibility 
conditions from the previous study with larger sample sizes (roughly N=200 per condition). 
 
4.2.1 Methods 
Methods were identical to Study 5, except that the two conditions soliciting blame attributions were 
excluded. Results for Study 6 were collected from 1628 participants, excluding 81 participants who 
failed the comprehension check.25 
 
4.2.2 Results 
Results are shown in Figure 5. As in Study 5, an ANOVA looking at ratings for the varied agent 
with norm (neutral, normed), structure (conjunctive, disjunctive), and term (cause, responsibility) as 
between-participant factors showed main effects for norm, F(1, 1619)=135.01, p<2.2e-16, η2=0.069, 
and structure, F(1, 1619)=69.30, p<2.2e-16, η2=0.036, but not for term, F(1, 1619)=0.55, p=0.46, 
η2=0.000. There was, however, a significant interaction effect between term and structure, F(1, 
1619)=6.20, p=0.013, η2=0.003, in addition to the interaction effect seen in Study 5 between norm 
and structure, F(1, 1619)=115.77, p<2.2e-16, η2=0.059. Interestingly, a matching ANOVA looking at 
 
25 74.3% women (17 non-binary), average age 32.4 years, ranging from 16 to 86. One-way ANOVAs showed no effect 
for gender on either ratings of the varied agent, F(2, 1624)=0.49, p=0.61, η2=0.001, or the fixed agent, F(2, 1624)=0.70, 
p=0.50, η2=0.001. 
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ratings for the fixed agent showed a main effect for term, F(1, 1619)=8.97, p=0.0028, η2=0.005, in 
addition to the effects seen in Study 5—main effects for norm, F(1, 1619)=44.59, p=3.3e-11, 
η2=0.025, and structure, F(1, 1619)=89.63, p<2.2e-16, η2=0.050, and an interaction effect for norm 
and structure, F(1, 1619)=21.89, p=3.1e-6, η2=0.012. 
While the results show a difference between the causal ratings and the responsibility ratings, 
the effect sizes for term were negligible. This is consistent with the responsibility view, which takes 
causal attributions and responsibility attributions to have a family resemblance, not that the two 
terms are pure synonyms. More importantly, as summarized in Table 6, we see the same overall 
pattern of effects for both causal ratings and responsibility ratings. As in Study 5, planned 
comparisons found the three predicted effects for causal ratings in the conjunctive conditions (there 
are significant cross-agent, varied agent, and fixed agent effects), and the same effects are also 
found for responsibility ratings. For the disjunctive conditions, however, for causal ratings the 
results again run counter to two of the three predictions made by the counterfactual view. No 
significant effects were seen here, despite the large sample sizes. And the same held for 
responsibility ratings. Finally, in line with the prediction derived from work on responsibility 
attributions, in the normed conditions causal ratings were significantly higher for the varied agent in 
the conjunctive scenario than in the disjunctive scenario, t(396.04)=9.87, p<2.2e-16, d=0.98 
(W=31458, p<2.2e-16), and similarly for responsibility ratings, t(365.87)=8.72, p<2.2e-16, d=0.89 
(W=26125, p=3.7e-16).  
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Figure 5: Results for Study 6 with histograms above the plots of the means for each condition and 
showing 95% confidence intervals.  
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Term Structure Cross-agent Effect Varied Agent Effect Fixed Agent Effect 
Cause 
Conjunctive 
t(204)=14.6, p<2.2e-16, d=1.02 t(409.33)=10.2, p<2.2e-16, d=1.00 t(408.77)=6.14, p=9.8e-10, d=0.60 
V=8406.5, p<2.2e-16 W=32446, p<2.2e-16 W=28614, p=2.7e-10 
Disjunctive 
R: t(204)=0.39, p=0.35, d=0.03 t(397.39)=0.86, p=0.19, d=0.09 t(395.87)=0.87, p=0.19, d=0.09 
R: V=1779, p=0.34 W=21770, p=0.22 W=21930, p=0.18 
Resp. 
Conjunctive 
t(184)=15.3, p<2.2e-16, d=1.13 t(394.99)=13.0, p<2.2e-16, d=1.30 t(385.44)=5.36, p=7.3e-8, d=0.54 
V=10853, p<2.2e-16 W=32228, p<2.2e-16 W=25844, p=1.2e-8 
Disjunctive 
t(192)=0.86, p=0.20, d=0.06 t(369.84)=0.11, p=0.46, d=0.01 t(367.32)=1.26, p=0.10, d=0.13 
V=2436, p=0.22 W=20813, p=0.38 W=21668, p=0.13 
 
Table 6: Tests of the cross-agent, varied agent, and fixed agent effects for Study 6. All tests one-
tailed, reverse effects indicated by “R,” significant results in red. 
 
 
4.3 Disjunctive Email Case 
In both Study 5 and Study 6 tests failed to find two of the three effects for causal attributions in 
disjunctive scenarios predicted by the counterfactual view: against the predictions the reverse cross-
agent effect and reverse varied agent effect were absent, but in line with the predictions the fixed 
agent effect was also absent. The absence of the fixed agent effect is also consistent with the context 
effect hypothesis, however, given the lack of a varied agent effect. To further investigate the effects 
for disjunctive cases, in Study 7 I tested a disjunctive version of the Email Case from Kominsky et 
al.’s second experiment. Subsequent to running this study, I found that in Icard et al.’s first 
experiment they tested causal ratings for the varied agent in a similar disjunctive version of this case, 
with slightly different wording, finding the predicted reverse varied agent effect.  
 
4.3.1 Methods 
Participants were given one or the other of two disjunctive versions of the Email Case. In the first 
vignette the varied agent (Billy) does not violate an injunctive norm, in the second vignette he does. 
In each vignette the fixed agent (Suzy) does not violate an injunctive norm. And in each vignette it 
is specified that important emails will be deleted if anyone logs into a central computer and that 
both agents log in. In both conditions, participants were asked to rate how much they agreed or 
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disagreed with each of two causal statements—“Billy caused the e-mails to be deleted” and “Suzy 
caused the e-mails to be deleted”—on the same 7-point scale used previously. Results were 
collected from 85 participants.26 
 
4.3.2 Results 
Results are shown in Figure 6. I tested each of the three effects identified in Section 1, as 
summarized in Table 7. None of the three predictions made by the counterfactual view were borne 
out: against the prediction that there would be a reverse cross-agent effect, there was a significant 
effect in the opposite direction; against the prediction that there would be a reverse varied agent 
effect, there was again a significant effect in the opposite direction; and, against the prediction that 
there would be no fixed agent effect, there was a significant difference.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Results for Study 7 with histograms to the right of the plot of the means for each 
condition and showing 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
 
 
 
26 55.3% women, average age 30.0 years, ranging from 16 to 83. One-way ANOVAs showed no effect for gender on 
either ratings of the varied agent, F(1, 83)=0.022, p=0.88, η2=0, or the fixed agent, F(1, 83)=1.38, p=0.24, η2=0.016. 
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4.4 Disjunctive Email Case, Replication 
Given that the finding of a varied agent effect in Study 6 runs counter to the results reported by 
Icard et al. (2017) and Kominsky and Phillips (2019), some care is again needed here. As such, in 
Study 8 I directly replicated the study with larger sample sizes (roughly N=200 per condition). 
 
4.4.1 Methods 
Methods were identical to Study 7. Results were collected from 393 participants.27 
 
4.4.2 Results 
Results are shown in Figure 7. As in the previous study, I tested each of the three effects and the 
results are summarized in Table 7. Results were similar, showing a significant cross-agent, varied 
agent, and fixed agent effect. Once again, this runs counter to the predicted pattern of effects given 
by the counterfactual view. 
 
Figure 7: Results for Study 8 with histograms to the right of the plot of the means for each 
condition and showing 95% confidence intervals. 
 
27 77.4% women (four non-binary), average age 29.4 years, ranging from 16 to 100. One-way ANOVAs showed no 
effect for gender on either ratings of the varied agent, F(2, 390)=0.62, p=0.54, η2=0.003, or the fixed agent, F(2, 
390)=0.98, p=0.38, η2=0.005. 
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Study Cross-agent Effect Varied Agent Effect Fixed Agent Effect 
7 
t(39)=3.83, p=0.00023, d=0.61 t(77.57)=1.67, p=0.050, d=0.37 t(80.664)=1.25, p=0.014, d=0.49 
V=206.5, p=0.00068  W=1106.5, p=0.030 W=1131, p=0.017 
8 
t(190)=4.58, p=4.1e-6, d=0.33 t(376.11)=2.57, p=0.0053, d=0.26 t(382.49)=1.86, p=0.032, d=0.19 
V=3524, p=5.2e-6  W=22092, p=0.0051 W=21532, p=0.019 
 
Table 7: Tests of the cross-agent, varied agent, and fixed agent effects for Studies 7 and 8. All tests 
one-tailed, reverse effects indicated by “R,” significant results in red. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
A number of competing explanations of the effect of norms on ordinary causal attributions have 
been put forward in the literature. In a recent pair of papers, Kominsky et al. (2015) and Icard et al. 
(2017) have offered strong support for one of these accounts—the counterfactual view—making 
several novel predictions about the overall pattern of effects found when expanding on the initial 
type of scenarios tested in the literature by including non-normative contrast cases and varying the 
causal structure. Insofar as the predicted pattern of effects holds, and insofar as the counterfactual 
view is able to explain each of these effects while alternative accounts (such as our responsibility 
view) cannot, this is strong evidence in favor of the counterfactual view. We have seen that there 
are difficulties with both of these assumptions, however.  
In this paper I have presented evidence casting doubt on the proposed pattern of effects. 
First, for conjunctive cases while the predicted cross-agent and varied agent effects reliably occur 
for injunctive norms in the cases tested, the fixed agent effect does not, only being found in a 
minority of comparisons for the Pen Case and Computer Case. Second, while the counterfactual 
view predicts that these three effects should occur for both injunctive and descriptive norms, in 
conjunctive versions of the Pen Case they were not found for one type of descriptive norm 
(population-level statistical norm) and tended to be reversed for a second type of descriptive norm 
(individual-level statistical norm). Third, for disjunctive versions of the Motion Detector Case, 
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across two studies only one of the three predictions made by the counterfactual view were borne out: 
against the prediction that there would be a reverse cross-agent effect, no effect was found, and 
against the prediction that there would be a reverse varied-agent effect, again no effect was found; 
but, in line with the prediction that the fixed agent effect would be absent, no effect was found. 
Further, for disjunctive versions of the Email Case none of the three predictions made by the 
counterfactual view were borne out: significant cross-agent effects, varied agent effects, and fixed 
agent effects were found in each of two studies. 
I’ve also raised doubts about whether the alternative accounts in the literature would actually 
be unable to explain the proposed pattern of effects, if the pattern were borne out. It is standardly 
accepted that these alternative accounts are able to explain the cross-agent and varied agent effects 
for conjunctive cases. Given that, I’ve argued that they are also able to indirectly explain the fixed 
agent effect. I made the case that this effect might be nothing more than a kind of artifact—a context 
effect with the varied agent providing the relevant context. And I reported on two studies showing 
that such a context effect can arise using the scales typically employed in work on causal attribution. 
While this does not establish that the fixed agent effect is simply a context effect, it does establish 
that it is a live possibility. With regard to disjunctive cases, I’ve argued that while a simple view 
focusing on just evaluations of the agents would lack the resources to explain why causal 
attributions vary with causal structure, the alternative accounts at issue are not like this. Rather they 
either focus on judgments that the agents are responsible for the outcome or to blame for the 
outcome or allow that such judgments are relevant to assessing the agent. As such, to test the 
alternative accounts, what is needed is to test further attributions in disjunctive cases. This was done 
in the two studies, and the results for responsibility and blame attributions were strikingly similar to 
those found for causal attributions. 
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